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Abstract—We propose and study the feasibility of wireless
quantum key distribution (QKD) in indoor environments. Such
systems are essential in providing wireless access to the developing
quantum communications networks. We find a practical regime
of operation, where, in the presence of background noise and
loss, secret keys can be exchanged. Our findings identify the
trade-off between the acceptable amount of background noise
and the receiver field of view, where the latter determines the
accessibility of the QKD system. In particular, we show that,
with a proper setting, we can provide mobility for the QKD
users without imposing stringent conditions on beam steering.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a promising
means for achieving security in the quantum era [1], when
our conventional techniques for data security, based on com-
putational complexity, may fail. QKD provides a method for
securely distributing random keys between two users based
on the laws of physics. It has been demonstrated over both
optical-fiber [2] and free-space channels [3]. Today, various
QKD systems are commercially available, e.g. ID Quantique.
In order to support a wider group of end users, QKD networks
are also being developed across the world. The focus of most
of these efforts is mainly on the core network [4], or the wired
access to such a backbone [5]. This works looks at another
unexplored dimension for QKD technology, and that is the
much needed wireless access to quantum networks. Wireless
QKD links will provide easy and convenient access to the
network nodes and can be implemented in office spaces or
corporates, such as banks, who are the main users of secure
communications. For instance, customers in a bank office can
exchange secret keys with the bank wirelessly without the need
for waiting for a teller or a cash machine, or being afraid of
skimming frauds. Such systems can eventually be implemented
for home users when QKD technologies reach that market.
This is in line with the ever increasing use of portable personal
devices and the high demand for data security in indoor
environments. Here we find the feasibility regime for QKD
in a single-room single-user scenario. Multiple users can also
be supported by using relevant multiple-access techniques [6].
Our results confirm that there exists a practical regime of
operation where secret keys can be exchanged using wireless
QKD links.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Here we look at a particular scenario in which we have
an empty window-less room, which has been illuminated by
an artificial source of light; see Fig. 1. For the sake of our
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Fig. 1. A wireless QKD link in an indoor setup. The transmitter is mobile,
while the QKD receiver is fixed on the ceiling.
numerical results, we assume a 4×4×3 m3 room. The lighting
source is assumed to be a Lambertian one with a semi-angle
at half power of 70◦. The key contribution of the light source
is via its power spectral density (PSD), denoted by S, at the
operating wavelength of the QKD link (880 nm, in our case).
We assume that the QKD link is composed of two components.
The QKD receiver is fixed and located at the center of the
ceiling, while the QKD transmitter can be anywhere on the
floor. We assume that at the receiver the unwanted light is
filtered out by using a narrowband filter with bandwidth 1/T ,
where T is the width of the transmitted pulses by the QKD
user. In our simulation we assume T = 100 ps. We also assume
that the decoy-state variation of the BB84 protocol is in use
[7], and assume infinitely many decoy states for our analytical
study of the secret key generation rate. In practice, one can
approach the same limit with a finite number of decoy states
[7]. The key advantage of the decoy-state protocol is to use
weak laser pulses, instead of ideal single photon sources, while
being immune to potential photon-number splitting attacks.
A critical component of our key-rate analysis is the back-
ground noise that enters our QKD receiver. By accounting for
the reflections from the floor and the walls [8], we calculate the
background noise from the lighting source at the QKD receiver.
The latter will go up with increase in S as well as the QKD
receiver’s field of view (FOV). The latter would determine how
much mobility may be allowed. We therefore look at the trade-
off between these two parameters in determining the secure
versus insecure regimes of operations.
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Fig. 2. Secret key generation rate versus the QKD receiver’s FOV and the
PSD of the lighting source. The QKD transmitter is located at the center of
the floor, while the QKD receiver is at the center of the ceiling.
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Fig. 3. Secret key generation rate versus the QKD receiver’s FOV and the
PSD of the lighting source. The QKD transmitter is located at the lower corner
of the room, while the QKD receiver is at the center of the ceiling.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider two scenarios that represent the best and the
worst working conditions for the QKD link described above.
In the fist scenario, we assume that the QKD transmitter, with
a semi-angle at half power of 30◦, is located at the center
of the floor sending light upwards to the QKD receiver. In
the second scenario, we assume that the same transmitter is
located at the lower corner of the room (farthest distance)
and it sends light vertically upward (loose beam steering). The
reflection coefficient off the walls is 0.7 and off the floor is
0.1, assuming that the carpet or the potential furniture have
less reflection than the walls. The employed single photon
detectors are assumed to have a quantum efficiency of 0.8 and
an effective area of 1 cm2. Considering the short duration of
the transmitted pulses, as compared to the delay in the reflected
beams, we neglect to collect the reflected QKD signals off the
walls. We also assume that none of these reflected pulses will
interfere with the forthcoming QKD pulses. That would imply
that the repetition rate of the QKD link must be on the order
of 100 MHz or lower, which is suitable for our scheme.
Figures 2 and 3, respectively, show the secret key gen-
eration rates that can be achieved in the setup of Fig. 1 in
the first and the second scenarios. The key rate is defined as
the probability of obtaining a secret key bit per transmitted
quantum signal. Both graphs roughly show in what regimes of
operation, in terms of the QKD receiver’s FOV and the lighting
source’s PSD, it is possible to exchange secret keys. For
large values of PSD, the FOV must be reduced to accumulate
less background noise, while in the other extreme, the QKD
receiver can be kept wide open allowing to cover a larger area.
The secure regime is also wider when the QKD transmitter is
better aligned and closer to its receiver. The rather large semi-
angle for the QKD transmitter would, however, allow us to
communicate with the QKD receiver even from the corner of
the room with little penalty in the generated key rate. These
results imply that for a room lit by white LED bulbs, with PSD
on the order of 10−6 W/nm at 880 nm, a large FOV can be
employed for the QKD receiver, which, in turn facilitates the
mobility of the transmitter device. Having large FOVs will also
make the system less dependent on accurate beam steering,
which reduces the complexity of the required modules. Given
that, by adjusting the FOV, we can even tolerate PSDs on
the order of 10−4 W/nm, one can be optimistic that such
systems can even work in the presence of other sources of light.
Proper beam steering may, however, be needed to minimize the
background noise level in such cases.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that there exists a practical regime of operation
within which a wireless QKD system can generate secret
keys. Such systems can provide the first link within a larger
quantum network or facilitate the use of QKD in common areas
for many users. Our work provided a theoretical feasibility
analysis for wireless and mobile QKD in its battle with the
background noise. A practical demonstration of such systems
will not be far away considering the extent of progress in
implementing QKD modules with integrated optics [9] as
well as the progress in beam steering in classical optical
wireless communications [10]. Such work will result in high-
rate wireless links for many QKD users.
The authors would like to thank Z. Ghassemlooy and D.
Bitauld for fruitful discussions.
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